Citizens Criminal Complaint filed in Clark County (Page 1 of 2)

April 29, 2011
To the Honorable President and Members,
The Senate of the State of Washington
Ladies and Gentlemen:

I am returning herewith, without my approval as to Sections 101, 201,407,410,411,412,601,
602,603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 801, 802, 803, 804,
805, 806, 807, 901, 902, 1104, 1201, 1202, 1203 and 1206, Engrossed Second Substitute Senate Bill 5073 entitled: “AN ACT Relating to medical use of cannabis.”

In 1998, Washington voters made the compassionate choice to remove the fear of state criminal prosecution for patients who use medical marijuana for debilitating or terminal conditions. The voters also provided patients’ physicians and caregivers with defenses to state law prosecutions.

I fully support the purpose of Initiative 692, and in 2007, I signed legislation that expanded the
ability of a patient to receive assistance from a designated provider in the medical use of
marijuana, and added conditions and diseases for which medical marijuana could be used.

Today, I have signed sections of Engrossed Second Substitute Senate Bill 5073 that retain the
provisions of Initiative 692 and provide additional state law protections. Qualifying patients or
their designated providers may grow cannabis for the patient’s use or participate in a collective
garden without fear of state law criminal prosecutions. Qualifying patients or their designated
providers are also protected from certain state civil law consequences.

Our state legislature may remove state criminal and civil penalties for activities that assist
persons suffering from debilitating or terminal conditions. While such activities may violate the federal Controlled Substances Act, states are not required to enforce federal law or prosecute people for engaging in activities prohibited by federal law. However, absent congressional action, state laws will not protect an individual from legal action by the federal government.

Qualifying patients and designated providers can evaluate the risk of federal prosecution and
make choices for themselves on whether to use or assist another in using medical marijuana.

The United States Department of Justice has made the wise decision not to use federal resources to prosecute seriously ill patients who use medical marijuana.

April 29, 2011
Page 2

However, the sections in Part VI, Part VII, and Part VIII of Engrossed Second Substitute Senate Bill 5073 would direct employees of the state departments of Health and Agriculture to authorize and license commercial businesses that produce, process or dispense cannabis. These sections would open public employees to federal prosecution, and the United States Attorneys have made it clear that state law would not provide these individuals safe harbor from federal prosecution.

No state employee should be required to violate federal criminal law in order to fulfill duties
under state law. For these reasons, I have vetoed Sections 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607,
608,609,610,611,701,702,703,704,705, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806 and 807 of Engrossed
Second Substitute Senate Bill 5073.

In addition, there are a number of sections of Engrossed Second Substitute Senate Bill 5073 that are associated with or dependent upon these licensing sections. Section 201 sets forth definitions of terms. Section 412 adds protections for licensed producers, processors and dispensers.

Section 901 requires the Department of Health to develop a secure registration system for
licensed producers, processors and dispensers. Section 1104 would require a review of the
necessity of the cannabis production and dispensing system if the federal government were to
authorize the use of cannabis for medical purposes. Section 1201 applies to dispensaries in
current operation in the interim before licensure, and Section 1202 exempts documents filed
under Section 1201 from disclosure. Section 1203 requires the department of health to report
certain information related to implementation of the vetoed sections. Because I have vetoed the licensing provisions, I have also vetoed Sections 201, 412, 901, 1104, 1201, 1202 and 1203 of Engrossed Second Substitute Senate Bill 5073.

Section 410 would require owners of housing to allow the use of medical cannabis on their
property, putting them in potential conflict with federal law. For this reason, I have vetoed
Section 410 of Engrossed Second Substitute Senate Bill 5073.

Section 407 would permit a nonresident to engage in the medical use of cannabis using
documentation or authorization issued under other state or territorial laws. This section would
not require these other state or territorial laws to meet the same standards for health care
professional authorization as required by Washington law. For this reason, I have vetoed Section 407 of Engrossed Second Substitute Senate Bill 5073.

Section 411 would provide that a court may permit the medical use of cannabis by an offender,
and exclude it as a ground for finding that the offender has violated the conditions or
requirements of the sentence, deferred prosecution, stipulated order of continuance. deterred
disposition or dispositional order. The correction agency or department responsible for the
person’s supervision is in the best position to evaluate an individual’s circumstances and medical use of cannabis. For this reason, I have vetoed Section 411 of Engrossed Second Substitute Senate Bill 5073.

April 29, 2011
Page 3

I am approving Section 1002, which authorizes studies and medical guidelines on the appropriate administration and use of cannabis. Section 1206 would make Section 1002 effective January 1, 2013. [have vetoed Section 1206 to provide the discretion to begin efforts at an earlier date.

Section 1102 sets forth local governments’ authority pertaining to the production, processing or
dispensing of cannabis or cannabis products within their jurisdictions. The provisions in Section 1102 that local governments’ zoning requirements cannot “preclude the possibility of siting licensed dispensers within the jurisdiction” are without meaning in light of the vetoes of sections providing for such licensed dispensers. It is with this understanding that I approve Section 1102.

I have been open, and remain open, to legislation to exempt qualifying patients and their
designated providers from state criminal penalties when they join in nonprofit cooperative
organizations to share responsibility for producing, processing and dispensing cannabis for
medical use. Such exemption from state criminal penalties should be conditioned on compliance with local government location and health and safety specifications.

I am also open to legislation that establishes a secure and confidential registration system to
provide arrest and seizure protections under state law to qualifying patients and those who assist them. Unfortunately, the provisions of Section 901 that would provide a registry for qualifying patients and designated providers beginning in January 2013 are intertwined with requirements for registration of licensed commercial producers, processors and dispensers of cannabis.

Consequently, I have vetoed section 901 as noted above. Section 101 sets forth the purpose of
the registry, and Section 902 is contingent on the registry. Without a registry, these sections are
not meaningful. For this reason, I have vetoed Sections 101 and 902 of Engrossed Second
Substitute Senate Bill 5073. I am not vetoing Sections 402 or 406, which establish affirmative
defenses for a qualifying patient or designated provider who is not registered with the registry
established in section 901. Because these sections govern those who have not registered, this
section is meaningful even though section 901 has been vetoed.

With the exception of Sections 101, 201, 407,410,411,412, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607,
608,609,610,611,701,702,703,704, 705, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 901, 902, 1104,
1201, 1202, 1203 and 1206, Engrossed Second Substitute Senate Bill 5073 is approved.
Respectfully submitted,
Christine Gregoire
Governor

Chapter 69.51A.055 RCW provisions below in section(3) clearly show in plain language the legislature and the Governor never intended any local authority located in Chapter 69.51A.140 over ANYTHING to do with the "USE" by Qualifying Patients be it alone or in association of such "USE" with "Collective Gardens or designated providers. The language relating to producer, processor and dispenser in .055(3) is the same language and common-sense meaning in reference to in section .140 Section 1102 sets forth local governments’ authority pertaining to the production ( licensed producer), processing( licensed processor) or dispensing( licensed dispenser) of cannabis or cannabis products within their local jurisdictions.

RCW 69.51A.055
Limitations of chapter — Persons under supervision.

(1)(a) The arrest and prosecution protections established in RCW 69.51A.040 may not be asserted in a supervision revocation or violation hearing by a person who is supervised by a corrections agency or department, including local governments or jails, that has determined that the terms of this section are inconsistent with and contrary to his or her supervision.

     (b) The affirmative defenses established in RCW 69.51A.043, 69.51A.045, 69.51A.047, and *section 407 of this act may not be asserted in a supervision revocation or violation hearing by a person who is supervised by a corrections agency or department, including local governments or jails, that has determined that the terms of this section are inconsistent with and contrary to his or her supervision.

     (2) The provisions of RCW 69.51A.040, 69.51A.085, and 69.51A.025 do not apply to a person who is supervised for a criminal conviction by a corrections agency or department, including local governments or jails, that has determined that the terms of this chapter are inconsistent with and contrary to his or her supervision.

     (3) A person may not be licensed as a licensed producer, licensed processor of cannabis products, or a licensed dispenser under *section 601, 602, or 701 of this act if he or she is supervised for a criminal conviction by a corrections agency or department, including local governments or jails, that has determined that licensure is inconsistent with and contrary to his or her supervision.

[2011 c 181 § 1105.]

Notes:
     *Reviser's note: Sections 407, 601, 602, and 701 were vetoed by the governor.

Article I, section 5 of the Washington State Constitution guarantees that "[e]very person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, [being responsible for the abuse of that right]." Although article I, section 5 generally "provides broader free speech protection than the first amendment to the United States Constitution," JJR Inc. v. City of Seattle, 126 Wn.2d 1, 8 n. 6, 891 P.2d 720 (1995), "the inquiry must focus on the specific context in which the state constitutional challenge is raised," and "it does not follow that greater protection is provided in all contexts," Ino Ino, Inc. v. City of Bellevue, 132 Wn.2d 103, 115, 937 P.2d 154 (1997).

The nature of this case requires holding that state constitutional free speech protection in the above context is no greater than that provided under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The United States Supreme Court has never directly addressed federal free speech protection in this type of context, but its case law in the commercial context is instructive. Commercial speech is not protected by the First Amendment if it is either unlawful or misleading. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub.Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980). Similarly, false and misleading statements made to public servants in the any context are not protected under federal and state constitutional free speech provisions. This [is] because there is even greater public interest in deterring false statements to ALL public servant context than there is in the commercial context. As the Court of Appeals aptly noted in State v. Budik, "[W]hile Mr. Budik may not have had any obligation to speak, ... if he chose to speak, [he was not privileged to mislead] police." State v. Budik, 156 Wn.App. 123, 128, 230 P.3d 1094, review granted, 170 Wn.2d 1008, 249 P.3d 624 (2010). Washington courts have consistently held that "`slight corroborative evidence'" is "all that is necessary to establish guilty knowledge." State v. Womble, 93 Wn.App. 599, 604, 969 P.2d 1097, review denied, 138 Wn.2d 1009 (1999); see State v. Couet, 71 Wn.2d 773, 776, 430 P.2d 974 (1967).

RCW 9A.08.010(4) provides that willful misconduct is satisfied if a person acts knowingly with respect to the offense’s material elements, barring some plainly evident purpose to impose further requirements. Accordingly, for purposes of knowledge proves willfulness. Clark County does not adopt all the state’s codified principles of liability when it comes to government employees.

“Recklessness” is a culpability state defined as one who “knows or and disregards a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his disregard of such substantial risk is a gross deviation from conduct that a reasonable man would exercise in the same situation.” RCW 9A.08.010(1)(c). For the reasons stated as to criminal negligence, aside from gross inattentiveness that would justify conviction under RCW 9A.80.010 (a)-(b); RCW 9A.76.175; and RCW 9A.76.090, the actions of these defendants showed tremendous deliberate indifference to the sensibilities of the known "DISABLED" complainant, as well as those others similarly situated.

"A person acts with intent or intentionally when he acts with the objective or purpose to accomplish a result which constitutes a crime." RCW 9A.08.010(1)(a).

"Specific intent cannot be presumed, but it can be inferred as a logical probability from all the facts and circumstances." State v. Wilson, 125 Wn.2d 212, 217, 883 P.2d 320 (1994). And "a trier of fact may infer that a defendant intends the natural and probable consequences of his or her acts." State v. Caliguri, 99 Wn.2d 501, 506, 664 P.2d 466 (1983).

This court should find probable cause does exist and also, recognize a true conflict exists in regards to the entire prosecutors office.  Therefore, in it's above cited lawful discretion, sign an order to conflict the entire county prosecutors office and replace them with a special prosecutor in the public interest to seek justice and prosecute the crimes .

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2 local News article(s) :

(1)- http://www.oregonlive.com/clark-county/ … rdens.html

A new Washington medical marijuana law taking effect Friday has local officials, including those in Clark County and Vancouver, calling for a six-month time out.

The law would allow up to 10 qualified medical marijuana users to establish a collective garden, where they could grow up to 45 plants for personal use. There is no limit on the number of gardens allowed in the state.

The gardens are what remain of a much larger medical marijuana bill partially vetoed by Gov. Chris Gregoire  in April. The partial veto left a patchwork of ambiguous and inconsistent rules that cities and counties are finding difficult to interpret, Vancouver City Attorney Ted Gathe said.

"The immediate solution is to simply put the brakes on establishing any of those until the city has the opportunity to set up a regulatory framework," Gathe said.

Under the law, cities and counties are responsible for passing zoning, health and safety rules for the gardens, as well as issuing businesses licenses and permits.

The Clark County commissioners voted July 12 to place a six-month emergency moratorium on collective medical marijuana gardens, and Vancouver followed suit Monday. Under state law, both have 60 days to hold a public hearing to allow the public a chance to comment on the moratorium.

This is the approach many cities and counties are expected to take, said Pat Mason, a legal consultant at the Municipal Research and Services Center of Washington. The Seattle non-profit provides research and consulting to local governments.

Taking six months to sort through the law also would give cities and counties an early look at proposals in the state legislature that could resolve the inconsistencies.

"In this state, there's a lot of interest in trying to fashion some set of regulation surrounding medical marijuana and its growth and distribution, but we're not quite there yet in terms of understanding how that would work," Mason said. "At the state level, I'm almost certain there's going to be something introduced that would clarify what can or cannot be done."

The act passed in the legislature was a comprehensive act expanding state protections for medical marijuana and legalizing dispensaries. It expanded on a 1998 voter-approved initiative that gave qualified patients a defense for possessing small amounts of the drug.

The act would have provided for the state to license and regulate commercial businesses that dispense cannabis, but federal officials told the governor that that could leave state employees open to prosecution under federal law, which sill considers marijuana an illegal drug.

"No state employee should be required to violate federal criminal law in order to fulfill duties under state law," Gregoire wrote in her veto statement.

Some cities and counties fear that zoning and permitting the collective gardens could put them in the same legally precarious position Gregoire feared for state employees.

"I think we kind of have this big question floating out there," said Axel Swanson, a policy analyst for Clark County.

And even if local officials wouldn't be at risk of prosecution, cities and counties still don't know how much authority they have to regulate the gardens under the gutted state law. The Municipal Research and Services Center notes on its website that it has changed its opinion twice already on whether municipalities can ban the collective gardens outright.

Seattle, which has been home to a booming dispensary industry for several years, has taken steps to bring marijuana dispensaries into the mainstream through regulation similar to other businesses.

Its city council this month passed rules requiring medical marijuana providers to get a business license and abide by the other rules most businesses are subject to. Gregoire's veto made many of the dispensaries illegal, but The Seattle Times reported they could recast themselves as legal collective garden co-ops with rotating member lists.

But Seattle is in the clear minority among Washington cities. Many across the state have already passed moratoriums while they sort out their own regulations and look for guidance from the state, and others are considering their options. Some fear litigation from medical marijuana advocates if they enact a moratorium.

"I think there's a lot of local jurisdictions who are going through this together," Swanson said. "This moratorium is a temporary action to give ourselves more time to react to the new law. The legislation is confusing, to say the least."

Clark County hasn't finalized a date for public hearings on continuing the moratorium, but the hearing is expected in August. Vancouver's is scheduled for Sept. 12.
---------------------

(2)-http://www.oregonlive.com/clark-county/index.ssf/2011/08/clark_county_approves_banning_marijuana_gardens_for_another_year.html

The Clark County Commission voted this morning to extend a temporary emergency moratorium on collective medical-marijuana gardens to one year.

The vote followed a public hearing the commission was required to hold after it voted in favor of a six-month moratorium in July. Representatives of the Clark County Sheriff's office and numerous citizens urged the commission to extend the moratorium.

"We need more time to study this problem and come up with safeguards for our neighborhoods," said Mike Cook, of Clark County's Sheriff's Office and commander of the Clark-Skamania County Drug Task Force.

The impetus for the moratorium was a new state law that would allow up to 10 qualified medical-marijuana users to establish a collective garden where no more than 45 plants could be grown for personal use. There is no limit on the number of gardens allowed in the state.

The gardens are what remain of a much larger medical-marijuana bill partially vetoed by Gov. Chris Gregoire in April. The partial veto left a patchwork of ambiguous and inconsistent rules that cities and counties have found difficult to interpret.

Under the law, cities and counties are responsible for creating zoning, health and safety rules for the gardens, as well as enforcement of the rules. Because Clark County had no ordinances in place that applied to the new law or marijuana gardens, officials sought a six-month moratorium to work on implementation.

Crimes associated with marijuana have increased in Clark County, Cook said. In 2008, there were 12 robberies associated with marijuana. In 2010, the number doubled.

There is also concern that Clark County may be vulnerable to a legal challenge from the federal government. The resolution passed today included an expression of concern that Washington state's new law may conflict with federal law.

"The United States' Department of Justice has been pretty clear recently about this issue, saying that people who knowingly facilitate these activities violate the Controlled Substances Act," said Axel Swanson, a senior policy analyst.

A half dozen people testified at the public hearing, all encouraging the commission to extend the ban.

Sue Lents, the president of the East Minnehaha neighborhood association, told the commission that 92 residents of the neighborhood attended a recent meeting when the issue of marijuana gardens was discussed. Most of them signed a petition "voicing grave concerns" about the possibility of gardens being located near their residences.

Kathryn Murdock, general counsel for the Vancouver School District, said that when the moratorium runs out and the commission approves zoning ordinances, the gardens should be prohibited from being grown within 500 feet of a school. She also asked that "growing of marijuana be strictly prohibited at any place or any location where it is visible or accessible by students along any established public walks, streets or public passageways used by students to go to and from school."

"They might take a detour, and pick a few leaves," she said. "We frequently hear that people's biggest source of drugs today is the family medicine cabinet. We ask that we not extend that to the neighborhood collective cannabis garden."

The city of Vancouver also approved a six-month ban in July. It is scheduled to hold a public hearing on Sept.

                       ---------------------------------------------------------------
                       THE KNOWN DISABLED Complainant's Affidavit of Fact & Chronology
                       ---------------------------------------------------------------

THE KNOWN DISABLED Complainant's Affidavit of Fact  & Chronology in support of finding as to all defendants and limited listed offenses; prima facia of probable cause exits, and a real and true conflict of interest with the county prosecutors office exists enough to garnish a signed order stating such . Herein, Chronology Order to meet minimal element requirement(s) of each offense.

This affidavit is intended to establish probable cause and does not set forth all of my communication(s) and/or knowledge about this matter.

For the reasons stated in this affidavit, inter alia, I the known disabled complainant therefore have probable cause to beleive that defendants, each and everyone of them has committed the criminal offenses of RCW 9A.80.010 Official misconduct, RCW 9A.76.175 Making a false or misleading statement to a public servant, and RCW 9A.76.090 Rendering criminal assistance in the third degree in the manner set forth in the criminal complaint.

                                               BACKGROUND FACTS

On March 17th, 2011 the known disabled complainant served upon the board of county commissioners a $20 million dollar tort claim notice with many documents attached in relation to the known disabled complainants disabilities found by a federal law judge dated Oct. 28th, 2010, medical record documents from the clark county jail dated 2000-2004, and disabled persons property tax exemption status dated 1999-2001 the county removed without just cause as complainants disabled wife lived in the home of the trust while complanant was in custody. Complainants known disabled wife did not vacate the home until complainant whom had his disablity rights removed by said clark county sheriffs dept. jail doctor in the medical records above was released from custody in 2002.  [see Exhibit 1 ]

On June 2nd and 3rd this was the first federal commandeering communications to be reasonbly relied upon in regards to discharging his or her official duties in relationship to the new law the governor partially vetoed by any of the named defendants.

From: Cooke, Mike
Sent: Friday, June 03, 2011 5:38 PM
To:Snell,Marty; Cook,Christene; Orjiako, Oliver
cc: Gaya,Holly; Swanson, Axel
Subject: RE: Marijuana dispensaries and county code

The bill did not ban dispensaries. In fact, the bill contains language that counties and cities can zone dispensaries, but they can't outright preclude them. It's more complicated then this so we all need to meet sometime soon. I think the fix is to put into county code a section which prohibits any business from opening which conducts activity which is illegal under state and federal law. I know this sounds obvious but the fear is that now a dispensary could open and then it would take a costly undercover investigation to make arrests, and even with arrests, we don't have the authority to close a business. The neighborhoods, and law enforcement, would rather have language on the front end which will prevent illegal businesses from opening in the first place. This is why we need to meet so we can get the expert opinions on how to do it.

From: Cooke, Mike
Sent: Thursday, June 02, 2011 9:52 AM
To: Cook, Christine; Snell, Marty; Orjiako, Oliver
Cc; Gaya, Holly
Subject: Marijuana dispensaries and county code

Christine, Marty, and Oliver

I am currently working with a group of neighborhood associations and neighborhood leaders on drafting some type or ordinance or addition to county code to deal with any potential marijuana dispensaries which may attempt to open in the county. I've recently received two inquiries from potential dispensary owners who want to open up shop in Clark County. All of us are interested in not allowing a business which conducts an illegal activity from opening it's doors in the county. We would rather prevent it on the front end rather than having to deal with it after it opens.

We've had some preliminary discussions on what we think needs to be done with the code but we really need to sit down with the experts(you) to work this out.(Edited out a time they didn't meet)

Here's the basic problem in a nutshell:

1. Marijauna is illegal under federal law in all cases, regardless of what states say. The US Supreme Court has affimed this.

2. Unfortunately, local prosecutors don't prosecute federal laws so on the local level medical marijuana is a legal defense which has allowed some individuals to avoid prosecution.

3. Marijuana dispensaries have been sprouting like weeds (pun intended) in all the states which have medical marijuana law. Cities and Counties have been passing emergency moratoriums and ordinances banning dispensaries but have found it extremely difficult to deal with them once they open. It's been much easier to have ordinances in place prior to the first one opening it's doors. Spokane County had in excess of 50 dispensaries at one point.

4. There appears nothing in the Clark County Code which would prevent a dispensary from opening it's doors.

5. The neighborhood associations are interested in a county code addition which would prevent any business, including dispensaries, from being permitted in the county when that business is engaged in activity which is illegal under state OR federal law.

This is a priority for neighborhoods so I told them that we would meet soon and come up with a solution.

Thanks.. Mike.

Commander-Mike Cooke
Clark-Skamania Drug Task Force

The federal government may not compel state law enforcement agents to enforce federal regulations. "[T]he Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the State's officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program." In Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997)

In early July of 2011 before sb 5073 took legal operational effect, the board instead of electing to file for injunctive and/or declaratory relief in the courts, they elected to use their alleged emergency moratorium authority under RCW 36.70A.390 and RCW 35.63.200 without public notice under the auspice in good faith and within the scope of their ASSIGNED duties under Chapter 69.51A.140 RCW intertwined with (if not bootstrapped to) 69.51A.130 RCW of land use and zoning districts on the use of cannabis by qualifying patients and designated providers, as well as qualifying patients collective gardens as necessary to further the public interest, for their health, safety, and welfare. Resolution 2011-07-04 [ see Exhibit 5 pg. 4-6 ]

On July 20th, 2011 before the law went into operational effect, the known disabled complainant sent an email to the full board of county commisioners in regards to the (FULL MONTY) prohibition moratorium.[see Exhibits 2 and 3 ]

On August 8th, 2011 the known disabled complainant recieved an email from Tina redline of the commissioners office in relation to my requests submitted. The response made claim the known disabled complainant would recieve the requested information by August 12th, 2011.[see Exhibit 2 ]

On August 16th, 2011, the board of Clark County Commissioners adopted and enacted resolution/ordinance No. 2011-08-07, after an invitation of special interested persons with prior notice of the public hearing. A true and correct copy of the resolution/ ordinance is attached to this complaint as exhibit 5 pg 4-6 and is incorporated by this reference.

Notice was given to the public for the hearing by the local media outlet. No copy of the emergency moratorium resolution was included to make the public aware of : the actual facts of why an emergency moratorium was necessary and/or used, nor why a design to assault qualifying patients resolution was being promulgated , nor a planned resolution to disenfranchise the voters of the state and property owners or those whom have interests in property by the clark county-Skamania drug task force agency commander Mike Cook and the defendants political and legal advisors.

The federal government may not compel state law enforcement agents to enforce federal regulations. "[T]he Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the State's officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program." In Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997)

The resolution/ordinance defines by reference relating to land use and zoning, continuing the temporary “prohibition“ of “any facilities for the growing or production, processing, or dispensing of marijuana prior to further study and public analysis” . The resolution also makes reference to the board needing more time to establish local criteria from churches, schools, bus stops, and other public gatherings sites to ensure that the public is properly protected. The resolution further states by reference the production, processing, dispensing of medical marijuana is an important public interest issue and the improper location of such “facilities” could cause serious harm to the public generally and particularly “VULNERABLE” populations, including youth. The resolution also makes by reference in 2011 the legislature has sought to expand the opportunities to grow, produce, process, and dispense medical marijuana in the state of Washington.

On August 21st, 2011 the known disabled complainant recontacted the board of county commissioners by email again re-requesting information on the moratorium. Complainant also submitted new requests also. [ Exhibit 3 ]

On August 21st, 2011 the known disabled complainant sent an email to the clark county prosecutor Tony Golik in regards to resolution NO. 2011-07-04 [see Exhibit 4 ]

The defendant(s):

(1) Claim they do have legal good faith authority under land use and zoning moratorium statutes to regulate and/or abate any medical use of cannabis by qualifying patients located in RCW 69.51A.025, RCW 69.51A.040, RCW 69.51A.045, RCW 69.51A.085 as it is not state law only regulated but, is federally regulated only , nor does the handicapped/disabled statute under RCW 36.70A.410 apply. [see above communications from commander mike cooke of the drug task force(s)dated June 2nd and 3rd of 2011 before the law went into operational effect]

(2) Admits and acknowledges the known disabled complainant is handicap/disabled as defined by state and federal laws.[Exhibit A ]

(3) Admits and acknowledges the known disabled complainant has a No. 1 disability exemption rating in relation to real property taxes due to complainants federal disability status. [ Exhibit B ]

(4) Admits and acknowledges to be in receipt of a $20 million dollar claim filed with clark county risk management dated March 17th, 2011 with the known disabled complainants retroactive social security disability ruling and order [backdating to Jan., 1st 1999] with finding of facts and conclusions of law by a federal administrative law judge containing 8 debilitating medical conditions under state and federal disability laws while using cannabis authorized under state law for complainants suspect class complex seizure disorder as defined as a HIGHLY protected class by congress and as clearly implicated in the judges order. Attached is also known disabled complainants medical records from the clark county sheriffs dept. showing complainants known disabilty status was removed by jail hired staff without cause . These records also show complainants medication was switched causing complainant to overdose contracting a seizure disorder and given no further medical treatment [Exhibit 1 ]

(5) Admits and acknowledges the known disabled complainant lives in a dwelling as described in RCW 36.70A.410 as defendant Clark County Code Enforcement has already attempted to abate complainant due to his disability status.[ Exhibit c ]

[Exhibit c] sent with public disclosure request of county files.                                           

                                                   NOTICE AND ORDER

Attn: James Barber

You are notified pursuant to clark county ord. no. 19757-12-51 and amendments thereto, that an "investigation" of the herein described premises has "revealed" the following "violations" of the clark co. code:

1. OCCUPANCY OF A TRAVEL TRAILER IN THE RURAL RESIDENTIAL (R5) ZONING OR. NO. 40.210.020

YOU ARE HEREBY ORDERED TO CEASE OCCUPANCY OF THE TRAVEL TRAILER WITHIN TEN(10) DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THIS NOTICE AND ORDER.

A penalty of $100 per day for each violation will be assessed, beginning ten(10) working days from the date this notice and order is served, until the herein mentioned corrections have been made. In addition, a "criminal" citation may "ordered" if this violation is not "ABATED".

From: Ellinger, Susan (Susan.Ellinger@clark.wa.gov)
Sent: Tue 4/19/11 11:50 AM
To:  james sr
  6 attachments
Case # CD PDF

content from Susan.Ellinger@clark.wa.gov
Mr. Barber -

Please find the additional information we received from archives with the exception of one file.  Due to the size of the documents, I will second a second e-mail with the last file.  If you desire data that has not been provided or find that the files do not contain the information you requested, please contact me immediately.  Otherwise, please accept the additional attachment as a formal close of your records request for the county.

Please let me know if you have any questions regarding any of these materials.  Thank you.

Sincerely,

Susan Ellinger
Administrative Services Manager
Clark County Community Development
1300 Franklin St.
Vancouver, WA 98660
360-397-2375 ext 5122
susan.ellinger@clark.wa.gov

Well Susan,

1) we are missing "ALL" police and court reports from the "sheriffs" office purtaining to the address and "names".

2)We are missing "ALL" the FEDERAL FUNDING contracts request.. drug task force of the "sheriffs" office..AND "ALL" REPORTS ABOUT ADDRESS AND NAMES ALSO.

3)We are missing "ALL" the financials of the "CLAIMED" liens you sent..i.e. where did the money go in which "satisfied" the liens per "regulations" .. and whom paid them.

4) Information in the file was redacted without "identifying" what was redacted by statute. it can be clearly seen but, it is whited out and not "blacked" out.

Is the county "attempting" to use the "public disclosure request" email as a source of "legal service/notice" for the most "recent" /living/dwelling discrimination issues, without just cause[except "retaliation" for filing a "claim" against the "commissioners" and other county "elected" officials.]? I noticed a letter of a violation "claimed" ... but, never found the "source" of the "complaint".. except in the 2008 "reasonable accommodation" documents, it makes claim of a violation then but, resolved... I have never moved from my motorhome to any other dwelling...and most "recent" request for county ADA regulations officer compliance with federal law... The info. I received said to give the county my medical "evidence" ... The SSA order "speaks" for itself..

I believe the "COUNTY" has my federal SSA "DISABILITY" order RETROACTIVE TO JAN. 1, 1999... UNDER FEDERAL LAW.

Common Sense would dictate the county is violating "FEDERAL LAW" ...and may be "good" cause for "contempt charges" to be brought.

I guess I will have to reform to filing another "risk management" claim...on different ground. and then contacting the judge whom signed the order.

Thank you for your swift attention.

Sincerely,

James Barber Sr.

Mr. Barber -

To the extent your request asks for additional documentation, we are reviewing the records already provided to ascertain whether there may be additional documents responsive to your request. We anticipate responding on or before Friday, April 29th.  If you have any questions before that time, please feel free to contact me.  Thank you.

Sincerely,

Susan Ellinger
Administrative Services Manager
Clark County Community Development
1300 Franklin St.
Vancouver, WA 98660

On December 2nd, 2011 the board of clark county commissioners with the assistance of the clark county prosecutors office and Axel Swanson wrote a letter to and sent US Attorney General Eric Holder [ Exhibit 5 pg. 10 ];

Quote : Engrossed Second Substitute Bill 5073 in part became Washington law on July 22, 2011. Section 403 of the new law allows qualifying patients and designated providers to "create and participate in collective gardens for the purpose of producing, processing, transporting and delivering cannabis for medical use." Gov. Chris Gregoire, in her statement explaining a partial veto of the bill, wrote the gardens "should be conditioned on compliance with local government location and health and safety specifications."

As pointed out above in the governors letter she never ever made the claims the defendants make to the Attorney General of the United States of America knowingly, willingly, recklessly, disregard of the material facts. Our own Wa. State Assistant
Attorney general letters to the governor do not refer to the collective gardens but, only the conduct under the Dept. of Agriculture and DOH licensing schemes which conflict with federal laws. It was specific to licensing of producers, processors and dispeners of cannabis and cannabis products. Their was no relation to provisons of the new law .025, .040, .045, .085 being criminal or in conflict with federal law enforcement duties. The Federal prosecutors under their distict charging discretion have choosen not to prosecute qualifying patients following state law. This reasoning is solitified by the federal court suppersion ruling noted above.

On Jan. 17th, 2012 the DEA received the letter dated December 2nd, 2011 sent to Eric Holder for a response. This is now the 2nd United States of America public offical relying on such known, willful, reckless false and misleding statements in the discharge of their official duties. [Exhibit 5 pg. 11]

On Feb. 2nd, 2012 the entire board of clark county commissioners recieved the response letter from Deputy Assistant Administrator of office of Diversion Control Joseph T. Rannazzisi in the discharge of his official duties. [Exhibit 11]

Both letters sent and recieved have now been sent to all of the local jurisdictions and is also being relied upon in the discharge of their official duties of other officals in the state of Washington. [ Exhibit 14]

On March 14th,2012 the known disabled complainant had a meeting with county prosecutor Chris Horne and Axel Swanson in which they supplied the complainant with the first of any prior requested document(s) in July of 2011 entitled "AGENDA" DATED 03/14/2012. [Exhibit 5]

On March 26th, 2012 after sending multiple emails to Axel Swanson in regards to the known, willful, reckless disregard of the facts, he wished to meet again with the known disabled complanant to discuss my legal analysis of varing sections of rcw 69.51A as CODIFIED and my opinion on how they should be best implimented( or not implimented) by local government. The known disabled Complanant agreed to meet with Mr. Swanson. [Exhibit 6]

On March 31st, 2012 the known disabled complanant sent an email to Clark County Administrator Bill Baron, Bill Baron has never replied except to continue on the same path.  [Exhibit 7]

On May 6th, 2012 the known disabled complainant sent an email to Axel swanson in regards to a question asked of the known disabled complainant in regards what to tell his special interest groups and friends of the homeowners assocation about the county not having any jurisdiction to ban non commercial, private use related to the qualifying patients collective gardens or discriminate against the disabled qualifying patients whom use or grow cannabis in their homes or yards out of the public view.[ Exhibit 8 ]

On May 14th and resent on the 17th, 2012 at the request of Axel Swanson, the known disabled complainant sent an email to Axel Swanson in regards to a prudently non discriminatory proper ord. which should have been passed and also some caselaw in regards to willfully, malice, denial of sustantive due process under 42 usc 1983, passing ord. in the interest of the public ONLY, i.e reasonablness [Exhibit 9 ]

On May 30th, 2012 the known disabled complainant sent an email to Broson Potter in regards to illegal county policy and no lawful local authority under the new codifed cannabis act in regards to the qualifying patients collective gardens and qualifying patients use. On June 6th, 2012 Mr. Potter responded he believes the county has the legal authority to to enforce zoning, business licensing, and health/safety regulations pertaining to the production, processing or dispensing of marijuana. He completely ignores and brushes off the known disabled complainants issues brought forth. [Exhibit 10 ]

On June 9th, 2012 the known disabled complainant sent an email to the board of clark county commissioners and Axel Swanson in regards to the federal case in spokane marijuana suppression hearing order. On June 11th, 2012 commissioner Mielke replied and also cc' others . Maybe we should have our "own" legal opinion too.tom [Exhibit 11 ]

On June 12th, 2012 the known disabled complainant sent an email to the all 3 commissioners, Axel Swanson, Chris Horne, and Linda Roberts in regards to secion rcw 69.51A.055 showing the jurisdiction and authority is over licensed producers, prosessors, and dispensers located in subsection provison (3), not collective gardens located in provion .085, .040, .025, nor provisions located in .043, .045, .047. [Exhibit 11]

On June 13th, 2012 @ approx. 10 am the board of clark county commisioners held a workshop in which prior to the work shop the known disabled complainant spoke with civil Deputy prosecutor Chris Horne in regards to the moratorium and lack of authority. Mr. Horne responded it was his belief the state laws are preempted by federal laws because they interfere with the federal duties if the drug task forces. In response, the known disabled complainant sent an email to Mr. Horne rebutting his assumtive beliefs, which was also cc' to the board of county commissioners. [ Exhibit 12 ]

On June 15th, 2012 the known disabled complainant contacted the clark county cheif deputy prosecutor for the clark county district court in regards to filing misdemeanor charges on the defenants herein. On june 15th, 2012 Mr. Jeff McCarty responed. [Exhibit 13 ]

This complaint followed as the WSP is conflicted in interest by contract with the clark county prosecutors office and the drug task force contracts.

[EXHIBIT 14A ]
Making a false or misleading statement to a public servant.
RCW 9A.76.175
A gross misdemeanor 

To sustain a conviction, the State must show that (1) a person made a false or misleading statement to a public servant and (2) that, in discharging his or her official duties, the public servant in question would reasonably rely on the false or misleading statement. This element is stated in the pattern jury instructions as: "That the defendant knew both that the statement was material and that it was false or misleading." 11A Washington Practice: Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal 120.04, at 473 (3d ed. 2008).

As the Court of Appeals aptly noted in State v. Budik, "[W]hile Mr. Budik may not have had any obligation to speak, ... if he chose to speak, [he was not privileged to mislead] police." State v. Budik, 156 Wn.App. 123, 128, 230 P.3d 1094, review granted, 170 Wn.2d 1008, 249 P.3d 624 (2010).

http://www.awcnet.org/LegislativeAdvoca … juana.aspx

Marijuana

All articles | Archives
Medical marijuana – 2/17/12

The medical marijuana legislation, SB 6265, failed to advance out of the Senate before Tuesday’s cutoff. The bill included some provisions clarifying local government’s authority over collective gardens. It also prohibited cities from precluding the siting of collective gardens. That provision sparked serious disagreement among cities. The bill was subject to some potential floor amendments, and the time necessary to negotiate the amendments, coupled with the rush of cutoff, meant that the bill did not make it to the floor for a vote before the deadline. This means that there will not be any additional guidance from the state on medical marijuana for cities, and we must continue to operate under the existing law that took effect in 2011.

Additionally, Clark County has been considering the issue of collective gardens and recently asked the Department of Justice for further clarification on the federal stance. The Department of Justice reiterated its position that marijuana is illegal and those facilitating illegal activity may be subject to legal action.
For more information, contact Serena Dolly or Candice Bock.
-----------------------------------------------------------

https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v& … QiYwivneXQ

clarkcountylettertoDOJ.pdf
--------------------------

http://archive.constantcontact.com/fs08 … 41395.html

WSAC Legislative Steering Committee Members updated on medical cannabis

On Wednesday evening, February 15th, WSAC Legislative Steering Committee members received an update on what counties were doing to implement SB 5073 - Medical Cannabis Collective Gardens that was passed during last year's legislative session.

To date, only one county (Lewis) has adopted an ordinance outlining the requirements to site/permit a Medical Cannabis Collective Garden. Several counties have put in place a moratorium and are developing and/or considering ordinances consistent with the new statute.  The vast majority of counties have decided to not act at this time. The following links will provide you:

    A PowerPoint presentation prepared by Brian Enslow provided to members of WSAC Legislative Steering Committee on Wednesday night.
    A copy of a letter from Clark County Board of Commissioners to the Department of Justice.
    A copy of a letter from the Department of Justice in response to the letter from Clark County Board of Commissioners
    A summary of a survey that provides a status for what counties are doing in response to SB 5073.
    Lewis County's Ordinance permitting such collective gardens providing a "federal license" has been issued.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact WSAC Executive Director Eric Johnson or WSAC Policy Director Brian Enslow.
-----------------------------

http://archive.constantcontact.com/fs08 … 41395.html

A PowerPoint presentation prepared by Brian Enslow provided to members of WSAC Legislative Steering Committee on Wednesday night.

Medical Cannabis:
County Implementation Issues
February 15, 2012
Brian Enslow
WSAC Policy Director
(360) 489 8121 or
8121-
benslow@wacounties.org
02/15/2012

5
Clark County and the DOJ
Clark County asked the U.S Attorney General:
“Would the Board.....or county employees b
“W ld th Bdtl be immune from arrest and liability when, in the
course of their jobs they do work related to
jobs, zoning, review of permits and inspection of these
facilities?”
02/15/2012
6
Clark County and the DOJ
U.S Attorney Response Back to Clark County:
“anyone who knowingly carries out th marijuana
“ h ki gl it the ij
activities contemplated by Washington state law, as
well as anyone who facilitates such activities or
activities, conspires to commit such violations, is subject to
criminal prosecutions...”

“Such persons may also be subject to money laundering statutes”
g
02/15/2012

Contact Info
Washington State Association of Counties
206 Tenth Avenue SE
T hA
Olympia, WA 98501
(360) 489-8121
www.wacounties.org/wsac
--------------------------

Last edited by james sr (2012-06-29 20:23:24)

However, the Complainant and the public have a right to demand the highest ethical standards for its public servants, particularly those acting on our behalf in the legal system. Unfortunately, today's courts fall short of ensuring accountability for attorneys who commit ethics violations and ensuring public transparency of the process. Both areas are critical in maintaining integrity and public confidence in a self-regulating profession.

"Without any question, the legal system has become a tool for bullying in this country," said Philip Howard, chair of the legal reform group Common Good. "And if you're a lawyer, [Linda Hollenbeck] and you don't have to go out and spend money for another lawyer, [because the District Attorney is protecting you from prosecution] you can use it as a hammer."

Judges have the option to hold those responsible in prosecutorial misconduct in contempt of court -- and to impose upon them fines, or even temporary imprisonment.

Too harsh? If you think so, consider that these prosecutors who are willing to send the Complainant to jail, or prison for crimes he did not commit, based on evidence from police reports that is untrue and tainted, and grossly incomplete, witnesses who provably lied, and an attorney who committed fraud on the court to get a bogus restraining order - and then to not to give the Complainant due process in a fair and impartial manner, refusing to their job of due diligence to make sure the Complainant receives a fairness -- Too harsh?

Would it really be so unfair for them to have a small taste of the confinement they have been willing to subject the Complainant to?

You can file your own affidavit in this case and send it into the court under the case number located above.

Don't be shy now either.

This is a time to speak our peace ad stop the craziness of the locals claiming jurisdiction over our homes and private grows known as "COLLECTIVE GARDENS" .

THIS CASE IS GOING TO COURT BEFORE A JUDGE !!!!

THIS IS NO JOKE.

PLEASE JOIN IN AND BE APART OF THE BANNING OF THE BANNING !!!

Hope to see more than just my complaint filed .. if just mine is heard.. sorry day for anyone to further complain..

I GOT US A COURT DATE !!

Nice planned design as noted by the email sent back below...

Talk about having the smoking gun... [ Exhibit 15]

04/15/2011

Dear Mr. Barber Sr. County Administrator Bill Barron asked me to research your request for information about county regulations pertaining to medical marijuana dispensaries.

You asked: "Does the County have any regulations on this at this time?"

My understanding in consultation with the Community Development Department is no we do not.

There is no law yet passed the Legislature and signed by the Governor allowing this use, so we have not begun writing regulations for it nor to my knowledge begun policy discussions with the Board of Commissioners regarding those potential regulations. If you haven't already, you may want to look into SB5073 and contact its primary sponsor Senator Kohl-Welles office at (360) 786-7670 to find out what is happening with the bill and if it is passed what language will be included to direct or not direct counties to promulgate regulations for this use.

You asked: "If not, is the county going to make regulations in regards to dispensaries and the like or ban them?"

Again, to reiterate what I said above; the law having not yet passed has not triggered any policy discussions that I am aware of at the Board level nor regulations resulting from them.

That said, you may be interested in the process that occurred in 2009 for drafting regulations for the locating of Opiate Substitution Treatment Facilities. You can find that ordinance on the County's website under Clark County Code: 40.260.165, Opiate Substitution Treatment Facilities.

I hope this helps, if you do have some insight into the future of this bill or concerns about its potential impacts to our county please do not hesitate to forward them to me or contact me and I will pass them along to our Board of County Commissioners.

Thank you for your interest, Axel Swanson, Senior Policy Analyst

4/14/2011 email to Bill Baron.
Hello Mr. Barron,

I was checking out some legislative issues and found that the legislature is proposing medical marijuana dispensaries and the like...

Does the county have any regulations on this at this time??

If not, is the county going to make regulations in regards to dispensaries and the like or ban them??

If no-one yet has any clue, I wish to make an appointment with someone in "charge of this area"... be it the sheriff "himself", drug task force "head", or the prosecutor "himself"... I think it is a commissioner issue though.

Please let me know, Thank you.

Sincerely,

James Barber Sr.

Last edited by james sr (2012-07-01 21:10:47)

LOVE the smoking gun

JAMES BARBER

    je.b.424@hotmail.com

To bernard.veljacic@clark.wa.gov
This is not a joke Bernard. Making a mockery of the profession and the court is political suicide .

And you intentionally deleted Mike Cooke from your pleadings... as a sacrifice?

Your motion is for time, not quash a court procedural defect, mistake or clerk' Scribners error.

I can point out so many more defects it would embarrass you.

But, here is one which fits for the occasion.

Crime or Fraud by Client

[3] Under Rule 1.2(d), a lawyer is prohibited from counseling or
assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent. Paragraph (b) states a specific application of the principle
set forth in Rule 1.2(d) and addresses the situation where a client's crime
or fraud takes the form of a lie or misrepresentation. Ordinarily, a lawyer
can avoid assisting a client's crime or fraud by withdrawing from the representation. Sometimes it may be necessary for the lawyer to give notice of the fact of withdrawal and to disaffirm an opinion, document,
affirmation or the like. In extreme cases, substantive law may require a lawyer to disclose information relating to the representation to avoid being deemed to have assisted the client's crime or fraud. If the lawyer
can avoid assisting a client's crime or fraud only by disclosing this information, then under paragraph (b) the lawyer is required to do so, unless the disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.

RULE 1.6
                        CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION

    (b) A lawyer to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:

    (1) shall reveal information relating to the representation of a client to
prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;

Filing what I file and whom I filed it against should show you I am not playing your games any longer. You want to a legal fight, bring it on Bernard.

Yours truly,

James E. Barber Sr

Subject: RE: In Re: The Matter of the Citizen Declaration for Probable Cause Hearing - James Barber
Date: Mon, 2 Jul 2012 16:38:32 -0700
From: Bernard.Veljacic@clark.wa.gov
To: je.b.424@hotmail.com

Sir:
The court granted the order to shorten time and set a hearing for Monday July 9 at 2:30 pm before Judge Hagensen to hear the issue of whether the notices sent to my clients should be quashed.  This is your notice of that hearing.
bv
_____________________________________________
From:   Veljacic, Bernard
Sent:   Monday, July 02, 2012 3:44 PM
To:     'je.b.424@hotmail.com'
Subject:        In Re: The Matter of the Citizen Declaration for Probable Cause Hearing - James Barber
Mr. Barber:
I am on my way to file with the court an ex parte motion for order to shorten time.  I intend to obtain a hearing date at which to argue that the notices sent to my clients by the court should be quashed.  This does not address the citizen complaint per se, but a procedural matter related to the notices sent by the District Court Clerk's Office.  When I obtain the date, I will advise you of when that is.  The materials I am filing with the court are attached hereto.
On a related note: you are required to provide a phone number on your pleadings, which would make communication on issues like this easier.  Please provide a number so I can give you a call on these matters in the future should the need arise.
Thank you.
bv
<< File: DOC.PDF >>
Bernard F. Veljacic
Clark County Prosecuting Attorney's Office
Civil Division
P.O. Box 5000
Vancouver, WA 98666-5000
(360) 397-2478
(360) 397-2184 fax
bernard.veljacic@clark.wa.gov

This e-mail and related attachments and any response may be subject to public disclosure under state law.

IN THE CLARK COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
                                      STATE OF WASHINGTON

   IN RE:
THE MATTER OF THE CITIZENS
COMPLAINT PROBABLE CAUSE
HEARING FILED BY JAMES BARBER SR.                                   NO. 2012-0000-0009 CIZ

                                                                           OBJECTION

                                                                     Motion to strike prosecutor
                                                                     motion(s) in response due to
                                                                     conflict of interest(s) and
                                                                     violation(s) of RPC rules
                                                                     

THE COMPLAINANT HEREBY REQUESTS THIS HONORABLE COURT TO STRIKE THE "CIVIL" MOTION TO QUASH FILED BY THE COUNTY CIVIL DIVISION PROSECUTORS OFFICE CLAIMING THEY REPRESENT ALL BUT ONE SAID NAMED CLIENTS IN THEIR EX PARTE MOTION, MIKE COOKE OF THE SHERIFFS OFFICE/DRUG TASK FORCE WITHOUT EXPLANATION TO EITHER THE COMPLAINANT NOR THE COURT.After giving notice to file CR11 sanctions Mr. Bernard refused to adhere to the rules and instead wrote another motion trying to fix his mistakes without retracting the prior legally flawed motions and he makes outright material false and misleading statements in hopes this court relying on such will use their authority to discharge their official duties. Mr. Bernard is a civil litigator for the county not a criminal prosecutor for the state. He lacks any authority to file any motions in this CRIMINAL case. He should be sanctioned and a report of violation of RPC rules should be filed by the court for such abuse of ones duties not assigned as a matter of law. The motion is from the civil division, this is not a civil case before the court.

THE COMPLAINANT HEREBY FURTHER OBJECTS TO ANY APPEARANCE FOR REPRESENTATION AS A CIVIL DEFENSE ADVOCATE AND NOT A WITNESS TO GIVE EVIDENCE BY THE CLARK COUNTY PROSECUTOR OFFICE CRIMINAL DIVISION IN THIS CASE AND FURTHER HEREBY OBJECT TO ANY MORE EX-PARTE COMMUNICATIONS PERIOD WITH SAID ASSIGNED COURT JUDGE OR ANY OTHER JUDGE ASSOCIATED WITH THE CLAIMS HEREIN THIS CASE OR OTHERS IN THE FUTURE WHICH MAYBE ASSOCIATED.

The complainant has requested this Honorable court to recuse the entire prosecutors office to starve off the furthering of criminal conspiracy activity by the named defendants associated with named enterprise(s) through their officers, officials and agents. Including but, not limited to employees of the executive and administrative branches of the county of clark  et. al. . under facts set forth in known "DISABLED" Complainant's Affidavit of Fact and Chronology in the court file records, which is incorporated by this reference as if fully restated herein coupled with all the new exhibits and documents now in the court file.The obvious out of touch with reality just to knowingly INTENTIONALLY interpose for improper purposes such as to annoy,delay, vex, and harass motions filed on July 3rd are great examples of why this court needs to take the bull by the horns and eliminate this mockery of the court, legal profession and the public trust by this entity and its employees. Not only did they get away in bad faith with selling the tortured view of the cannabis act to create these so called emergency moratoriums because they say it gives them authority to abuse their trust the public handed them i.e.enforce  FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS (read governor gregiores statement specifically about NOT enforcing federal laws by state or local government) and the now before the court knowingly false tortured claims of complainant wants collective gardens regulations by local government, when in fact by looking at all the communications to all the named defendants, just the opposite is the bare FACTUAL truth in this case at bar. Complainant has shown beyond a reasonable doubt the county has no authority over collective gardens other than to permit the use under prior county code without any abatement authority or registration As the county wants to ban all use from Their whole pitch has been they have authority under RCW 69.51A.140 in good faith as it is their assigned duties as said in .130. They are now trying in bad faith selling the same cheap china made window dressing to the court. This is AMERICA, not china. I must say one thing though, it sure is entertaining seeing the same active overt act patterns in written statements which is knowingly material false and misleading for a public servant to rely upon in the discharge of their official duties.

Where a state statute licenses (as in vetoed sections of licensed producers,processors,and dispensers located in section .140) a particular activity, counties may enact reasonable regulations of the licensed activity within their borders but they may not prohibit same outright. Compare Second Amendment Found. v. City of Renton, 35 Wash.App. 583, 589, 668 P.2d 596 (1983). ( Governor Gregiores statement letter addresses this specifically, "is without meaning", i.e. can prohibit said sections as the governor vetoed but, nothing more)

6A Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 24.54, at 150 (3d rev. ed.1997) ("that which is allowed under state law cannot be prohibited by ordinance"). see ord. 2011-07-04 and 2011-08-07 prohibits that which is authorized by state law explicitly, which is field preempted on more than one front.

  This principle dates back to the earliest days of statehood. See Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union 741 n. 2 (6th ed. 1890) ("If the municipal authority should assume to declare something which was entirely lawful by the law of the State to be a nuisance, the declaration would be a mere nullity because in conflict with the superior law.").

The same principle has been more freely extended to the quasi legislative acts of inferior municipal bodies, in respect to which it is an ancient jurisdiction of judicial tribunals to pronounce upon the reasonableness and consequent validity of their by-laws. In respect to these, it was the doctrine, that every by-law must be reasonable, not inconsistent with the charter of the corporation, nor with any statute of Parliament, nor with the general principles of the common law of the land, particularly those having relation to the liberty of the subject or the rights of private property. Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 3d ed., § 319, and cases cited in notes. Accordingly, in the case of The State of Ohio ex rel. &c. v. The Cincinnati Gas-Light and Coke Company, 18 Ohio St. 262, 300, an ordinance of the city council purporting to fix the price to be charged for gas, under an authority of law giving discretionary power to do so, was held to be bad, if passed in bad faith, fixing an unreasonable price, for the fraudulent purpose of compelling the gas company to submit to an unfair appraisement of their works. And a similar question, very pertinent to the one in the present cases, was decided by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in the case of the City of Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Maryland, 217. In that case the defendant had erected and used a steam engine, in the prosecution of his business as a carpenter and box-maker in the city of Baltimore, under a permit from the mayor and city council, which contained a condition that the engine was "to be removed after six months' notice to that effect from the mayor." After such notice and refusal to conform to it, a suit was instituted to recover the penalty provided by the ordinance, to restrain the prosecution of which a bill in equity was filed. The court holding the opinion that "there may be a case in which an ordinance, passed under grants of power like those we have cited, is so clearly unreasonable, so arbitrary, oppressive, or partial, as to raise the presumption that the legislature never intended to confer the power to pass it, and to justify the courts in interfering and setting it aside as a plain abuse of authority," it proceeds to speak, with regard to the ordinance in question, in relation to the use of steam engines, as follows: "It does not profess to prescribe regulations for their construction, location, or use, nor require such precautions and safeguards to be provided by those who own and use them as are best calculated to render them less dangerous to life and property, nor does it restrain their use in box factories and other similar establishments within certain defined limits, nor in any other way attempt to promote their safety and security without destroying their usefulness. But it commits to the unrestrained will of a single public officer the power to notify every person who now employs a steam engine in the prosecution of any business in the city of Baltimore, to cease to do so, and, by providing compulsory fines for every day's disobedience of such notice and order of removal, renders his power over the use of steam in that city practically absolute, so that he may prohibit its use altogether. But if he should not choose to do this, but only to act in particular cases, there is nothing in the ordinance to guide or control his action. It lays down no rules by which its impartial execution can be secured or partiality and oppression prevented. It is clear that giving and enforcing these notices may, and quite likely will, bring ruin to the business of those against whom they are directed, while others, from whom they are withheld, may be actually benefited by what is thus done to their neighbors; and, when we remember that this action or non-action may proceed from enmity or prejudice, from partisan zeal or animosity, from favoritism and other improper influences and motives easy of concealment and difficult to be detected and exposed, it becomes unnecessary to suggest or to comment upon the injustice capable of being brought under cover of such a power, for that becomes apparent to every one who gives to the subject a moment's consideration. In fact, an ordinance which clothes a single individual with such power hardly falls within the domain of law, and we are constrained to pronounce it inoperative and void."

In Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U. S. 116, Seattle had a zoning ordinance that permitted a " `philanthropic home for children or for old people' " in a particular district " `when the written consent shall have been obtained of the owners of two-thirds of the property within four hundred (400) feet of the proposed building.' " Id., at 118.

The Court held that provision of the ordinance unconstitutional, saying that the existing owners could "withhold consent for selfish reasons or arbitrarily and may subject the trustee [owner] to their will or caprice." Id., at 122. Unlike the billboard cases (e. g., Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U. S. 526), the Court concluded that the Seattle ordinance was invalid since the proposed home for the aged poor was not shown by its maintenance and construction "to work any injury, inconvenience or annoyance to the community, the district or any person." 278 U. S., at 122.

It involves  procedural disparity inflicted on some but not on others such as was presented by Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12.

It involves violations of "fundamental" right guaranteed by the Constitution, such as voting, Harper v. Virginia Board, 383 U. S. 663;

The right of association of like minded is eliminated, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449; Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as the U.S. Supreme Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 364; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 530. It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the "liberty" assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 666; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 324; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303; Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U. S. 313, 321. Of course, it is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural matters, and local government action in the name of the federal government which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny.

The right of access to the courts is being denied at the very beginning administrative level by the defendants, NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415; or

Any rights of privacy are  banished by prohibition, cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 453-454.

As found in Glaspey & Sons v. Conrad, 521 P. 2d 1173 - Wash: Supreme Court 1974 this case is on point on bad intentions and lack of good faith.

The question is whether the amendments were validly enacted. Since they were not, "the board's good intentions are for naught".

Finally, in a long line of cases we have sought to bring order, fundamental fairness, and the appearance of fairness into the field of zoning. See Fleming v. Tacoma, 81 Wn.2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972); Buell v. Bremerton, 80 Wn.2d 518, 495 P.2d 1358 (1972); Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, 78 Wn.2d 858, 480 P.2d 489 (1971); Smith v. Skagit County, 75 Wn.2d 715, 453 P.2d 832 (1969). In the area of public hearings we have made considerable progress. However, a proper hearing can be no greater protection for the public and the individual landowner than the opportunity afforded by the notice to take an informed part therein. If one, whether in favor of or opposed to a zoning ordinance, is forced to attend a zoning hearing "both unprepared for and uninformed about the purpose, the hearing will be a farce, despite the safeguards thrown around it".

The zoning ordinance and amendments thereto were enacted based upon an invalid notice. The trial court and the Court of Appeals are reversed.

HALE, C.J., FINLEY, ROSELLINI, HUNTER, HAMILTON, WRIGHT, and UTTER, JJ., and JOHNSON, J. Pro Tem., concur.

Petition for rehearing denied June 28, 1974.

Another Jurisdiction which is on point. "When the state has preempted a field, the city must follow that scheme or refrain from planning." Bellefonte Land, Inc. v. Bellefonte, 864 S.W.2d 315, 317 (Ky.App.1993). See also Creative Displays, Inc. v. City of Florence, 602 S.W.2d 682 (Ky.1980); City of Lakeside Park v. Quinn, 672 S.W.2d 666 (Ky.1984); and Daviess County v. Snyder, 556 S.W.2d 688 (Ky.1977).

Both The enacted ordinance(s) without lawful authority nor any jurisdiction to do so, improperly and criminally preempts the state's vested rights doctrine. Under this doctrine, a developer has a right to have its building permit applications processed according to the zoning and building ordinances in effect at the time the applications are submitted, regardless of subsequent changes in land use regulations. RCW 19.27.095(1); Erickson & Assocs. v. McLerran, 872 P.2d 1090, 1092-93 (Wash.1994); West Main Assocs. v. Bellevue, 720 P.2d 782, 785 (Wash.1986). The doctrine seeks primarily to allow developers to determine or "fix" the rules that will govern their land development. Id. at 785. It also "aims at ensuring that new land-use ordinances do not unduly oppress development rights, thereby denying a property owner's right to due process under the law." Valley View v. Redmond, 733 P.2d 182, 192 (Wash.1987).

The vested rights doctrine protects developers against the effect of new regulations, not proceedings authorized by existing regulations.

Due process requires governments to treat citizens in a fundamentally fair manner. West Main Assocs. v. Bellevue, 106 Wn.2d 47, 51, 720 P.2d 782 (1986). Consequently, citizens must be protected from the fluctuations of legislative policy, West Main Assocs., at 51 (citing The Federalist No. 44, at 301 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961)), so that they can plan their conduct with reasonable certainty as to the legal consequences. West Main Assocs., at 51. Property development rights constitute "a valuable property right." West Main Assocs., at 50 (quoting from Louthan v. King Cy., 94 Wn.2d 422, 428, 617 P.2d 977 (1980)). Thus new land use ordinances must satisfy due process standards by meeting a 2-part test: (1) the new regulation must aim at achieving a legitimate public purpose; and (2) the means used to achieve that purpose must be reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. West Main Assocs., at 52; Norco Constr., Inc. v. King Cy., 97 Wn.2d 680, 684, 649 P.2d 103 (1982).

"A property owner has a vested right to use his property under the terms of the zoning ordinance applicable thereto". A building or use permit "must issue as a matter of right upon compliance with the ordinance". The discretion permissible in zoning matters is that which is exercised in adopting the zone classifications with the terms, standards, and requirements pertinent thereto, all of which must be by general ordinance "applicable to all persons alike". The acts of administering a zoning ordinance do not go back to the questions of policy and discretion which were settled at the time of the adoption of the ordinance. Administrative authorities are properly concerned with questions of compliance with the ordinance, not with its wisdom. To subject individuals to questions of policy of administrative matters would be unconstitutional....

    ... "An owner of property has a vested right to put it to a permissible use as provided for by prevailing zoning ordinances. The right accrues at the time an application for a building permit is made". The moves and counter-moves of the parties hereto by way of passing ordinances and bringing actions for injunctions, should and did avail the parties nothing. "A zoning ordinance is not retroactive so as to affect rights that have already vested".

(Citations omitted.) The Washington Supreme court  has rejected the rule of many jurisdictions which requires a change of position and a substantial reliance on the building permit before "equitable estoppel arises to rescue the by then financially extended landowners". 1 R. Anderson, Zoning § 6.24, at 408-09 (2d ed. 1976). See Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wn.2d 125, 331 P.2d 856 (1958).

Washington's "date certain vesting rights doctrine" aims at "insuring that new land-use ordinances do not unduly oppress development rights, thereby denying a property owner's right to due process under the law". See West Main Assocs., at 50-52. Focusing on the date building permit applications are submitted "protects development rights and, at the same time, provides two safeguards against developer speculation": (1) once a permit issues, a time limit is imposed on construction; and (2) preparing the detailed plans and specifications required for the application involves a substantial cost to the developer. Hull v. Hunt, at 130. In addition, the permit application date facilitates determining with certainty what the developer has applied for and "what specific rights have accrued as a result". See Hull v. Hunt, supra at 130; see also Mercer Enters. v. Bremerton, 93 Wn.2d 624, 633, 611 P.2d 1237 (1980) (Utter, C.J., dissenting).

In the ordinary course of events, a developer's right to develop in accordance with a particular zoning designation vests only if the developer files a building permit application that (1) is sufficiently complete, (2) complies with existing zoning ordinances and building codes, and (3) is filed during the effective period of the zoning ordinances under which the developer seeks to develop. West Main Assocs., at 51; Allenbach v. Tukwila, 101 Wn.2d 193, 676 P.2d 473 (1984). Due process considerations of fundamental fairness require this court to look beyond these four requirements to the conduct of the parties only in the rare case where city officials clearly frustrate a developer's diligent, good faith efforts to complete the permit application process. See Mercer Enters. v. Bremerton, supra; Parkridge v. Seattle, 89 Wn.2d 454, 573 P.2d 359 (1978).

In Parkridge, this court created a limited exception to the requirement of completeness of building permit applications. The issue there was whether a right to develop land could vest despite an incomplete building permit application when the developer's diligent attempts to complete the application prior to the zoning change had been obstructed by the local government. This court held that a development right had vested, notwithstanding the incompleteness of the application, because the developer's good faith conduct merits recognition of the vested right. Parkridge, at 465-66.

This court then applied the Parkridge rule in Mercer Enterprises to hold that a developer's building permit application, including a site plan, can be considered as a whole for the purpose of determining whether a building permit complied with the existing zoning ordinances. Mercer Enterprises, at 633-34. Although standing alone the building permit exceeded the density restrictions of the zoning ordinance, when considered together with the site plan for the total development project, the building permit densities were within the density restrictions. The developer's building permit application was held sufficient to establish vested rights in that portion of the project in which building permit applications were filed.

The above clearly illuminates the complainant(s) "PROPERTY" rights, interests and benefits was illegally removed for the benefit and personal gain of others with no local government rights to said property, interests in said property, nor any of my benefits, nor any lawful abridgment rights of the fundamental rights of complainant mentioned above. But, they all certainly had personal gain and profits.

The  Complaint inferred charging the entire prosecutors office with criminal offenses after probable cause is found by the court AND AN ARREST IS PROCURED, with proper discretion as to not have absurd or unjust results such as favoritism, the court finds in the name of justice a special prosecutor shall be appointed to "properly" represent the state, charges are filed and the discovery process is allowed to run its course as required by court rules, and within the bounds of the law. Not withstanding the following violations of The Washington Rules of Professional Conduct (“WA. RPC”) also inferred by the motion to recuse:

(1). WA. RPC 1.1 (claim one)[failure to provide competent representation to
a client];

(2). WA. RPC 1.2(d) (claim two)[assisting a client in engaging in criminal
or fraudulent conduct];

(3). WA. RPC 3.3(a)(1) (claim three)[knowingly making a false statement of material fact to a tribunal];

(4). WA. RPC 3.3(a)(2) (claim four)[knowingly failing to disclose a material fact when disclosure is necessary to
avoid assisting in a criminal or fraudulent act by a client];

(5). WA. RPC 4.1(b)(claim five)[failing to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure
is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client];

(6). WA. RPC 8.4(c) (claim six)[conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation];

(7). WA. RPC 8.4(d) (claim seven)[conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice];

(8). WA. RPC 8.4(b)(claim eight)[commission of a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness and fitness to practice law] constituting grounds for discipline and sanctions as provided under WA..
law (any act or omission which violates the criminal laws of this state or any other state) .

Based upon Standards std. 5.11(a), a Board would conclude that the appropriate sanction for the prosecutors misconduct shall be disbarment. A Board properly could determine the presumptive sanction, and so should this Honorable court. The entire prosecutors office ethical violations include:

(1) criminal acts that reflect adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness, and fitness as a lawyer(s);

(2) conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, and deceit; and

(3) acts involving moral turpitude and disregard for the rule of law.

Further, they ALL possessed the culpable mental state that is an essential element of this criminal complaint. See Standards  defining "intent" as "the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result."; see also Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63, 118 S.Ct. 469, 139 L.Ed.2d 352 (1997) (stating that the partners in a conspiracy "must agree to pursue the same criminal objective."); United States v. Becker, 720 F.2d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir.1983) ("The essential elements of conspiracy are `an agreement to accomplish an illegal objective, coupled with one or more overt acts in furtherance of the illegal purpose and the requisite intent necessary to commit the underlying substantive offense.'" (quoting United States v. Sangmeister, 685 F.2d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir.1982))); United States v. Adkinson, 158 F.3d 1147, 1153 (11th Cir.1998) (stating that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 371 requires the government to "prove beyond a reasonable doubt that each defendant had a `deliberate, knowing, specific intent to join the conspiracy'" (quoting United States v. Cole, 755 F.2d 748, 755 (11th Cir.1985))). The entire prosecutors office possessed the requisite intent necessary to engage in BOTH a state and federal criminal conspiracy that gave rise to this criminal complaint with hard core serious egregious ethical violations. Lastly, this criminal offensive misconduct caused not only potential injury to property, life of the intended victim(s) of this knowingly, reckless conspiracy but, did so intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with malice and the publics perception of criminally corrupt lawyers hiding behind their license to do so are intolerable acts too the egregious harms to the legal profession are at the core. If it wasn't for these illegal concerted criminal acts, the complaint would not have been filed. IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IS NO EXCUSE !!

Standards std. 5.11(a) states that disbarment is generally appropriate if a lawyer engages in any "serious criminal conduct a necessary element of which includes ... misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriation, or theft." The entire prosecutors office knowingly engaged in a conspiracy to commit misrepresentation(s),fraud, extortion, misappropriation(s) and theft of property rights, benefit(s), and interests for personal gain under the color of law that would no doubt not only potentially would harm the victim(s) of this fraudulent scheme but, with certainty harm the profession, this court, the public and their families.

For a member of the bar to participate, directly or through intermediaries, in such misuses of the legal process is conduct traditionally condemned as injurious to the public.

The court should strike the ex-parte motion, ALL appearance motion(s), motion(s) to dismiss and any other filed documents by the Clark County Prosecuting Attorneys Office as a matter of law and justice and require some other non conflicted interest "private" legal counsel to represent said named defendants in the complaint as a matter of law and justice to keep the court itself protected from any potential conflicts which maybe created by said prosecutors office hence, making the court a criminal party.

Although a local legislator may vote on an issue, that alone does not necessarily determine that he or she was acting in a legislative capacity. Rather, "whether actions ... are, in law and fact, an exercise of legislative power depends not on their form but upon `whether they contain matter which is properly to be regarded as legislative in its character and effect.'" Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560, 580 (9th Cir.1984) (quoting I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 2784, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983)), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054, 105 S.Ct. 2115, 85 L.Ed.2d 480 (1985). Therefore this district court must look to "the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it," Forrester, 484 U.S. at 229, 108 S.Ct. at 545

Mr. Bernard makes claim that the only witnesses before the court should be present and heard which hence, is allegedly the complainants witnesses or others whom have filed an affidavit with the court in reference to these cases at bar. The statutes plain language is to the contrary. The only required person to appear is the complainant themselves with evidence of probable cause for the judge to weigh upon with the courts knowledge of the law(s) before the court, as the judge is the courts only expert in saying what the law is and is not. Not to mention the gate keeper of allowing charges to be filed or not upon the showing of a prima facie cause a crime has been committed in the records before said courts jurisdiction. see e.g; STATE v. GLUCK, 83 Wn.2d 424, 518 P.2d 703 (1974)

Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in a belief that an offense has been or is being committed. Beck v. Ohio,379 U.S. 89, 91, 13 L.Ed.2d 142, 85 S.Ct. 223 (1964); Henry v. United States,361 U.S. 98, 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 134, 80 S.Ct. 168 (1959); Brinegar v. United States,338 U.S. 160, 175, 93 L.Ed. 1879, 69 S.Ct. 1302 (1949); State v. Parker,79 Wn.2d 326, 485 P.2d 60 (1971); State v. Ellison,77 Wn.2d 874, 467 P.2d 839 (1970).

"shall appear before a judge empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the State", other than a judge pro tem. This specific language does not mandate when the complainant must appear before said authorized judge, it just says one must at some point in the process shall appear. This is further enforced by "the judge MAY require the appearance to be made on the record, and under oath.. discretionary within the courts arena. Proven example is, The complainant could be a C.I. for another investigating government agency.

The court may also grant an opportunity at said hearing for "evidence" to be given by the county prosecuting attorney or deputy, the potential defendant or attorney of record, law enforcement or other potential witnesses. i.e. the named defendants . The above says MAY grant an opportunity at said hearing for "evidence",( not unauthorized motions from the civil division with no new evidence to add in a criminal case but, just trying to explain why the defendants are in a paper bag they put themselves into) to be given by the county prosecutor or deputy, the potential defendant or attorney of record, law enforcement or other potential witnesses. ( the above language connotes the CRIMINAL DIVISION FOR ENFORCEMENT  PURPOSES OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, not the civil division drowning in a tort claim they are liable for)

The court may also require the presence of other potential witnesses. ( Not county civil division "legal" advocates in appearance of a criminal case to represent the state)

May is discretionary upon the court and to claim otherwise is knowingly making a material false statement. ( or one is unfit to practice law would be the other option)

The court served notice within its discretion via its clerk of the court by constitutional sound court rules and the courts daily business.

The complaint clearly states all named in the complaint are both witnesses and defendants, not just one or the other but, both.

                      (c)  Citizen complaints: Any person wishing to institute a criminal action alleging a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor shall appear before a judge empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the State, other than a judge pro tem.

(1). The judge "may" require the appearance to be made on the record, and under oath;

(2). The judge "may" consider any allegations on the basis of an affidavit sworn to before the judge;

(3). The court "may" also grant an opportunity at said hearing for "evidence to be given" by the county prosecuting attorney or deputy, the potential defendant or attorney of record, law enforcement or other potential witnesses;

(4). The court "may" also require the presence of other potential witnesses;

(5)  In addition to probable cause, the court "may" consider:

   (1) Whether an unsuccessful prosecution will subject the State to costs or damage claims under RCW 9A.16.110, or other civil proceedings;

   (2) Whether the complainant has adequate recourse under laws governing small claims suits, anti-harassment petitions or other civil actions;

   (3) Whether a criminal investigation is pending;

   (4) Whether other criminal charges could be disrupted by allowing the citizen complaint to be filed;

   (5) The availability of witnesses at trial;

   (6) The criminal record of the complainant, potential defendant and potential witnesses, and whether any have been convicted of crimes of dishonesty as defined by ER 609; and

   (7) Prosecution standards under RCW 9.94A.440.

"If the judge is satisfied that probable cause exists", and factors (1) through (7) justify filing charges, and that the complaining witness is aware of the gravity of initiating a criminal complaint, of the necessity of a court appearance or appearances for himself or herself and witnesses, of the possible liability for false arrest and of the consequences of perjury, the judge may authorize the citizen to sign and file a complaint in the form prescribed in CrRLJ 2.1(a). The affidavit may be in substantially the following form:

Thats five MAY and one SHALL in the text of the statute. Mr. Bernard of the "CLARK COUNTY CIVIL DIVISION" wants this court to turn the court rules AND STATE LAWS plain language on its head like they all did with the cannabis act and the  emergency to enact a death penalty without notice.

    The complainant is not requesting the complainant prosecute these cases because under the rpc and general code of ethics one with an unmitigated seizure disorder is handicapped from practicing law as said person would not properly represent the client, in this case the people of the state of Washington by special prosecution under the obvious wide discretion of the court statutory legal theory of chapter rcw 36.27.030 and .040, RPC 1.2(d)clients crimes and frauds(and relevant comments), RPC 8.4 misconduct(and relevant comments) and the advocate-witness rule should all apply.

                     Disqualification of entire clark county prosecuting attorneys office

Mr. Golik is the elected clark county prosecuting attorney and took office on January 3, 2012. In schmitt, the court of appeals distinguished between the disqualification of a deputy prosecutor and the elected prosecutor. In the former instance, a specific deputy with a conflict can be screened. When the elected prosecutor has a conflict, such screening is not possible. State v. Schmitt, 124 Wn. App. at 668-69 citing State v. Stenger, 111 Wn .2d 516, 522-23, 760 P.2d 357 (1998). Division two in Schmitt noted: "Although stenger involved the application of rpc 1.9(a) and rpc 1.11, not rpc 3.7, we can not perceive an application distinction here" 124 Wn. App. at 668 n.9 .

  Similarly here, Mr. Golik is the elected prosecuting attorney of clark county.Where it is his and his entire office conflict that is one of the driving issue(s), this entire office needs to be disqualified.

                               The court should appoint a special prosecutor

      RCW 36.27.030 provides:

When from illness or "other cause", the prosecuting attorney is temporarily unable to perform his or her duties, the court or judge may appoint some qualified person to discharge the duties of such officer in court until the disability is removed.

When any prosecuting attorney fails, from sickness or "other cause", to attend a session of the superior court of his or her county or is unable to perform his or her duties at such session, the court or judge may appoint some qualified person to discharge the duties of such session and appointee shall receive a compensation to be fixed by the court, to be deducted from the stated salary of the prosecuting attorney not exceeding, however, one fourth of the quarterly salary of the prosecuting attorney PROVIDED:, that in counties wherein there is such person qualified for the position of prosecuting attorney, or wherein no qualifying person will consent to perform the duties of that office, the judge of the superior court shall appoint some suitable person, a duly admitted and practicing attorney-at-law and resident of the state to perform the duties of prosecuting attorney for such county and he or she shall receive such reasonable compensation for his or her services as shall be fixed and ordered by the court, to be paid by the county for which the  services are performed.

    RCW 36.27.040 then provides for the mechanism of the appointing special deputy prosecutors.

       In State v. Stenger, the superior court relied on both of these statutes for ordering that a special prosecutor be appointed to represent the State in the case where Mr. Curtis had a conflict of interest. 111 Wn.2d at 523.

Since the superior and district court rules in civil and criminal are on equal due process footing terms, as well as RPC ethics and both have jurisdiction over both misdemeanors and gross misdemeanors logic and common sense should apply to the district court having the same discretion over the same criminal elements without any real true threats of abuse of discretion claims.

  This court has the power to right wrongs, stop injustice, eliminate crime which comes before it by jail, fine, or both of the offending persons, and remove ANY lawyer from practicing in their court rooms. The court should therefore, order that Mr. Golik and his entire office be disqualified from any more appearances on the record as an advocate (instead of a witness or a defendant) making claims to be in representation of any named in this case, and should appoint a special prosecutor to "properly" represent the states interest. ONLY disqualification of the entire office and appointment of a special prosecutor not "TAINTED BY CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND FURTHER ACTING IN CONCERT TO FURTHER COMMIT CRIMINAL OFFENSES "UNFETTERED" will suffice under constitutional muster.

Complainant hereby prays to this court to sign the attached order striking the ex-parte motion and ALL others in there entirety and also an order denying the clark county prosecutors office from representing any named or unnamed defendants in relations to the complaints context and ordering the CLAIMED defendants to seek private counsel for advocating further in their defense and pleadings to the court.

Signed this 4th day of July 2012 in the county of clark.

Respectfully submitted,

____________________________
James E. Barber Sr.
20118 N.E. 174th st.
Brush Prairie, WA. 98606

IN THE CLARK COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF WASHINGTON

NO. 2012-0000-0009
IN RE:
THE MATTER OF THE CITIZENS
COMPLAINT PROBABLE CAUSE
HEARING FILED BY JAMES BARBER SR. MOTION TO QUASH
ORDER QUASHING ALL MOTIONS FILED
BY THE CLARK COUNTY PROSECUTING
ATTORNEYS OFFICE CIVIL DIVISION

COMES NOW the complainant JAMES E. BARBER SR. and hereby moves this HONORABLE court for an entry of an order quashing ALL motions and documents filed by the CLARK COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS OFFICE CIVIL DIVISION as they do not have the right to represent the state under their assigned duties, as they represent the county only in civil matters. THIS CASE IS A CRIMINAL CASE. This basis for this motion is as follows:

(1) This is a criminal case at bar in which the civil division does not have authority to prosecute criminal process before any court of law, especially this court.

(2) The officer of the court after CR11 sanctions notice, continued to file frivolous motions with the court with arguments turning the court process on its head with no valid purpose of doing so.

DATED THIS 4TH DAY OF JULY, 2012.

_________________________
JAMES E. BARBER SR.
20118 N.E. 174th St.
Brush Prairie, WA. 98606

Given malice and the lack of probable cause, the complainant enjoyed no immunity. The common law thus affords no support for petitioner.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340—341 (1986) (footnote omitted).

The above goes to say since they enacted a death moratorium with malice ( enacting a death penalty by lowering the elements for such deprivation without lawful authority )   and  no probable cause existed to warrant an emergency to enact it under any legislative immunity.. they are burnt.

Washington Criminal Rule 2.2(a) provides: “A warrant of arrest must be supported by an affidavit, … or sworn testimony establishing the grounds for issuing the warrant… . The court must determine there is probable cause … before issuing the warrant. ”

Last edited by james sr (2012-07-07 15:23:16)

IN THE CLARK COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
                                      STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                                                                                                                                                 NO.2012-0000-0009                 
CR11 sanctions motion

                                        CR11 SANCTION MOTION

THE COMPLAINANT HEREBY MOTIONS AND MOVES THIS HONORABLE COURT TO ORDER REASONABLE SANCTIONS FILED AGAINST THE COUNTY PROSECUTORS OFFICE. BY CLAIMING THEY REPRESENT ALL BUT ONE SAID NAMED CLIENTS IN THEIR MOTION. MIKE COOKE OF THE SHERIFFS OFFICE/DRUG TASK FORCE WITHOUT EXPLANATION TO EITHER THE COMPLAINANT NOR THE COURT.

THE COMPLAINANT HEREBY OBJECTS TO THE APPEARANCE NOT FILED, AND IF FILED IN THIS CASE MR. BERNARD HAS NOT SHOWN SO AND ANY FURTHER OBJECTS TO ANY FURTHER EX-PARTE COMMUNICATIONS WITH SAID ASSIGNED COURT JUDGE OR ANY OTHER JUDGE ASSOCIATED WITH THE CLAIMS HEREIN THIS CASE OR OTHERS IN THE FUTURE WHICH ARE ASSOCIATED.

The complainant has requested this Honorable court to recuse the entire prosecutors office to starve off the furthering of criminal conspiracy activity by the named defendants associated with named enterprise(s) through their officers, officials, employees and agents, NOT ASSIST IN FURTHERING IT. Including but, not limited to employees of the executive , legislative and administrative branches of the county of clark  et. al.

If a motion or pleading lacks a factual or legal basis, the trial court may impose CR 11 sanctions if it finds the attorney who signed and filed the motion or pleading failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the factual and legal bases of the claims.

These email(s) were sent to potential defendants alleged legal counsel in response to his "ex-parte" communications motion he emailed me (knowing he as well as his alleged clients have my contact number to my home) with said court order showing his influence on the court in light of the known criminal allegations and exhibits located in the complaint showing the dearth of the defendant(s) conspiracy scheme of acting in concert to render criminal assistance. The said prosecutor of the clark county prosecutors office wants this court to believe he has been screened properly under the guise of his name is not located in the complaint only named others from his office of the civil division are... This confusing legal theory fails.

JAMES BARBER

    je.b.424@hotmail.com

To bernard.veljacic@clark.wa.gov
Hello Bernard,

I also guess your claiming my motion of the recusing the entire office from appearing in any clark county court in relation to this case is also procedurally defective ? .

I suggest taking up the issue of the arrest warrant with another lawyer to appear.

Ex parte motions for your alleged purpose is not prudent nor ethical. ETHICALLY, You can not represent the claimed defendants in any capacity.

As for my phone number, your clients have this as they have called me on more than one occasion and it's located in the exhibits in emails. Your claims are frivolous to say the least. We have ourselves spoken on more than one occasion my dear counsel.

Have fun in court explaining all this lack of due diligence Bernard. In case you or your alleged claimed clients have forgotten my phone number which is listed by dialing information. (360)-882-6906

I will see someone in court on the 9th. Hope it isn't any county prosecutor .

At that end, I agree the Court will have to deal with it own procedures in a process which is due by law.

First code learned in law school is the code of ethics and secondly, the rpc clearly cover this subject matter. So does Cr 11 sanctions.  Third, tactics are a catch-22.

Yours Truly,

James E. Barber Sr.

JAMES BARBER

    je.b.424@hotmail.com

To bernard.veljacic@clark.wa.gov

This is not a joke Bernard. Making a mockery of the profession and the court is political suicide .

And you intentionally deleted Mike Cooke from your pleadings... as a sacrifice?

Your motion is for time, not quash a court procedural defect, mistake or clerk' Scribners error.

I can point out so many more defects it would embarrass you.

But, here is one which fits for the occasion.

Crime or Fraud by Client

[3] Under Rule 1.2(d), a lawyer is prohibited from counseling or
assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent. Paragraph (b) states a specific application of the principle
set forth in Rule 1.2(d) and addresses the situation where a client's crime
or fraud takes the form of a lie or misrepresentation. Ordinarily, a lawyer
can avoid assisting a client's crime or fraud by withdrawing from the representation. Sometimes it may be necessary for the lawyer to give notice of the fact of withdrawal and to disaffirm an opinion, document,
affirmation or the like. In extreme cases, substantive law may require a
lawyer to disclose information relating to the representation to avoid
being deemed to have assisted the client's crime or fraud. If the lawyer
can avoid assisting a client's crime or fraud only by disclosing this
information, then under paragraph (b) the lawyer is required to do so,
unless the disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.

RULE 1.6
                        CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION

    (b) A lawyer to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:

    (1) shall reveal information relating to the representation of a client to
prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;

Filing what I file and whom I filed it against should show you I am not playing your games any longer. You want to a legal fight, bring it on Bernard.

Yours truly,

James E. Barber Sr

(360)-882-6906 IF you don't get it.

Subject: RE: In Re: The Matter of the Citizen Declaration for Probable Cause Hearing - James Barber
Date: Mon, 2 Jul 2012 16:38:32 -0700
From: Bernard.Veljacic@clark.wa.gov
To: je.b.424@hotmail.com

Sir:
The court granted the order to shorten time and set a hearing for Monday July 9 at 2:30 pm before Judge Hagensen to hear the issue of whether the notices sent to my clients should be quashed.  This is your notice of that hearing.
bv
_____________________________________________
From:   Veljacic, Bernard
Sent:   Monday, July 02, 2012 3:44 PM
To:     'je.b.424@hotmail.com'
Subject:        In Re: The Matter of the Citizen Declaration for Probable Cause Hearing - James Barber
Mr. Barber:
I am on my way to file with the court an ex parte motion for order to shorten time.  I intend to obtain a hearing date at which to argue that the notices sent to my clients by the court should be quashed.  This does not address the citizen complaint per se, but a procedural matter related to the notices sent by the District Court Clerk's Office.  When I obtain the date, I will advise you of when that is.  The materials I am filing with the court are attached hereto.

On a related note: you are required to provide a phone number on your pleadings, which would make communication on issues like this easier.  Please provide a number so I can give you a call on these matters in the future should the need arise.
Thank you.
bv
<< File: DOC.PDF >>
Bernard F. Veljacic
Clark County Prosecuting Attorney's Office
Civil Division
P.O. Box 5000
Vancouver, WA 98666-5000
(360) 397-2478
(360) 397-2184 fax
bernard.veljacic@clark.wa.gov

This e-mail and related attachments and any response may be subject to public disclosure under state law.

                                              ANALYSIS

CR 11 requires attorneys to date and sign all pleadings, motions, and legal memoranda. This signature constitutes the attorney’s certification that the attorney has read the pleading, motion, or legal memorandum, and that to the best of the . . . attorney’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:

(1) [the pleading, motion or memorandum] is well grounded in fact;

(2) it is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;

(3) it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation . . . . CR 11 continues,

If a pleading, motion, or legal memorandum is signed in violation of this
rule, the court, upon motion, . . . may impose upon the person who signed
it . . . an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the
other party . . . the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because
of the filing, . . . including a reasonable attorney fee.

The purpose of the rule is to deter baseless filings and frivolous pleadings.1
Courts employ an objective standard in evaluating an attorney’s conduct and test
the appropriate level of pre filing investigation by inquiring what was reasonable
to believe at the time the pleading was filed.2 Prompt notice of the possibility of
sanctions fulfills the primary purpose of deterring litigation abuses.3 Thus, an
attorney who perceives a possible violation of CR 11 should bring it to the
attention of the offending party as soon as possible.4 The better practice is to
inform counsel specifically of the nature of the violation and the possibility of CR
11 sanctions, but general notice that sanctions are contemplated is sufficient.5
The violation of CR 11 occurs upon the filing of the offending pleading; hence,
an amendment or withdrawal of the pleading or a voluntary dismissal of the suit
does not expunge the violation, although it may mitigate the sanction.6
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
1.In Bryant v. Joseph Tree, Inc., 119 Wn.2d 210, 220, 829 P.2d 1099 (1992).

2. Biggs v. Vail, 124 Wn.2d 193,197, 876 P.2d 448 (1994); Bryant, 119
Wn.2d at 220; Miller v. Badgley, 51 Wn. App. 285, 299-300, 753 P.2d 530
(1988) (after 1985 amendment to CR 11, rule now imposes an objective rather
than subjective standard of reasonableness).

3 N. Coast Elec. Co. v. Selig, 136 Wn. App. 636, 649, 151 P.3d 211(2007).

4 Biggs, 124 Wn.2d at 198; N. Coast Elec., 136 Wn. App. at 649 (party should move for CR 11 sanctions as soon as it becomes aware they are warranted).

5 Biggs, 124 Wn.2d at 199.

6 Biggs, 124 Wn.2d at 199-200.

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

An ex parte motion is not the correct proper ethical process in this context to be used before the court by the civil division under the serious egregious facts alleged with documentation as proof a crime did occur.

This is not a special proceeding like family law is.

The proper process is the have the prosecutors office entirely recuse itself from representation to ward off any further criminal activity by said enterprise and acting through its employees to assist their alleged clients in the furtherance of criminal offenses. To allow the motion, would be to involve the court in the furtherance of said conspiracy of rendering criminal assistance by said officer of the court Honorable Judge Haganson  further violating the rpc 8.4 rules of professional misconduct bring the court into disrepute .

The complainant prays this court for reasonable sanctions pursuant to court rule CR11.

Signed this 3rd day of July 2012.

__________________________________

James E. Barber Sr.
20118 N.E. 174th St.
Brush Prairie, Wa. 98606